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Greenhouse 11 Id. 12 See Motion for Declaratory Judgment, South Carolina v. Holder, at 2 (D.C.D.Ct. 2012) ("To deny preclearance or to apply Section 5 of the VRA in the demanding manner in which the United States applied it in denying administrative preclearance would bring into serious question the constitutionality of Section 5 of the VRA."), found in http://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/2012-02-07-Complaint-Voter-ID.pdf) (last visited February 15, 2012). 13 See Perry v. Perez, No. 11-713 et al., slip op. at 7 (Jan. 20, 212) ("This Court recently noted the "serious constitutional questions" raised by §5's intrusion on state sovereignty. Those concerns would only be exacerbated if §5 required a district court to wholly ignore the State's policies in drawing maps that will govern a State's elections, without any reason to believe those state policies are unlawful."). 14 See Lee Epstein and Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37 (2008) .
This might be unwelcomed news to those familiar with Kennedy's old race jurisprudence. In his concurring opinion in City of Richmond v. Croson, 15 for example, Justice Kennedy wrote that " [t] he moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause." 16 In saying this, he counseled that the use of race by the state must only be "a last resort." 17 Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 18 he referred to the use of race by the state as a "corrosive category" 19 and argued that "[p]referment by race, when resorted to by the State, can be the most divisive of all policies, containing within it the potential to destroy confidence in the Constitution and in the idea of equality. The majority today refuses to be faithful to the settled principle of strict review designed to reflect these concerns." 20 These are hardly isolated instances. Over the course of his long tenure on the bench, Justice Kennedy has demonstrated time and again that his approach to the use of race by the state is narrow, formalistic, and one that ultimately renders the state action at issue unconstitutional. 21 More recent cases, however, suggest that Justice Kennedy's views are evolving. Consider in this vein the recent Parents Involved v. Seattle School District No. 1. 22 In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court struck down two voluntary racial integration plans for public schools in Louisville and Seattle. But only a plurality of justices would go as far as to prohibit any use of race in student assignments. 23 Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote yet refused to go quite that far. In a separate concurrence, he left open some room for school boards to consider the use of race in student assignments while pursuing the goal of integration. 24 This is the aspect of Kennedy's opinion that strikes a familiar chord. He is comfortably in the middle, wielding inordinate power and control as the Court's "super median." This is also where the familiarities end.
To read Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved is to see a side of the Justice we have not seen before. This is true from the first paragraph of his opinion:
The Nation's schools strive to teach that our strength comes from people of different races, creeds and cultures uniting in commitment to the freedom of all. In these cases two school districts in different parts of the country seek to teach that principle by having classrooms that reflect the racial makeup of the surrounding community. That the school districts consider these plans to be necessary should remind us our highest aspirations are yet unfulfilled. 25 15 488 U.S. 469 (1989) . 16 Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 17 Id. at 519. 18 539 U.S. 306 (2003) . 19 Id. at 394. 20 Id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 21 . 23 See id. at 725-33, 745-48. 24 See id. at 787-90. 25 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782.
This opening salvo highlights Justice Kennedy's posture in his concurrence. The framing is inescapable. Take, for example, his view later in the opinion that " [t] he enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often it does." 26 In direct response to the plurality's pithy phrase that " [t] he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race," 27 Kennedy argues that "[f]ifty years of experience since Brown v. Board of Education . . . should teach us that the problem before us defies so easy a solution." 28 Kennedy even takes on Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy and the view that " [o] ur Constitution is color-blind." This statement often stands at the heart of conservative attacks on race conscious measures. Yet Kennedy argues that while justified in the racialized context of the late-nineteenth century, it is not justified today as anything more than an aspiration. "In the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle." 29 The contrast between these two judicial approaches to the use of race by the state is palpable. But it is more than just the explicit words that Justice Kennedy uses to express his views; it is the spirit in which he writes them and the tenor of his opinions. To read his early opinions on race is to see an unyielding skepticism about the use of race by the state. This is true across contexts, whether college admissions, 30 employment, 31 set-asides, 32 or redistricting. 33 But his more recent opinions -of which Parents Involved is an example 34 -cannot be similarly catalogued. The racial skepticism remains, to be sure, but it is a skepticism now tempered by a far different view of the world and of the role that race plays within it, both as historical artifact and social reality. Even as he joined the judgment of the Court in Parents Involved, for example, Justice Kennedy wrote that " [t] he Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children." 35 And in LULAC v. Perry, 36 a case that examined the notorious mid-census political gerrymander in Texas, Justice Kennedy concluded that the decision to dismantle a district where Latino voters would soon achieve majority status violated the Voting Rights Act. This was a remarkable departure for Justice Kennedy, not the least of which because this was the first time during his tenure on the Court when he voted to find a statutory violation under the Act. What makes his LULAC opinion "striking" 37 is the reason he offered for his conclusion: that the state had only decided to break up the 26 Id. at 787. 27 Id. at 748. 28 Id. at 788. 29 Perhaps most important, it is not yet clear how Justice Kennedy will be changed by his vastly expanded influence. Justice O'Connor was very aware of her position as the swing justice, and it made her deeply aware of the impact her votes had on real people's lives. Justice Kennedy may inherit that mantle of concern. It is one thing to argue in dissent that campaign finance laws violate the First Amendment. It is quite another to cast the vote that prevents a nation weary of lobbying scandals from trying to clean up its elections.
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This same argument may be applied to Justice Kennedy's equal protection jurisprudence. Once he came to the middle, and the outcome of some of the most hotly contested policy questions hinged on his vote, the stakes changed. This is a persuasive explanation, but only to a point. Swing justices are often pragmatists, putting together opinions that will satisfy a majority of five. This is one way to explain Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter, for example, or Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, as triumphs in pragmatism. But Justice Kennedy is hardly a pragmatist but an idealist, and his opinions in LULAC and Parents Involved clearly suggest as much. 41 Justice Kennedy is not looking for the lowest common denominator among the justices but is instead able to reach for the stars and write exactly the opinion he wishes to write unencumbered by the noise from neighboring chambers. Thus the question remains: how to explain his changing views?
A second explanation argues that Kennedy's clear shift is not about race but about the particular "constitutional domains" 42 where the cases arose. On this view, LULAC was not a case about Latinos and their nascent political power but, rather, about the First Amendment, political agency and expression. Similarly, Parents Involved was less about race than about the role that public schools should play in democratic society. This is an intriguing answer, but it also falls short. To be sure, this is not the first time that Justice Kennedy has deployed a "domain" analysis. In the peremptory challenge cases, for example, he writes of jury service as "an exercise of responsible citizenship by all members of the community, including those who otherwise might not have the opportunity to contribute to our civic life." 43 Even when peremptory challenges are used by private litigants, Justice Kennedy argues that, though protecting a private interest, "the objective of jury selection proceedings is to determine representation on a governmental body." 44 And in Lee v. Weisman, 45 which involved the deliverance by a rabbi of prayer during a high school graduation ceremony, he described the event as follows:
Graduation is a time for family and those closest to the student to celebrate success and express mutual wishes of gratitude and respect, all to the end of impressing upon the young person the role that it is his or her right and duty to assume in the community and all of its diverse parts. 46 To the answer that a student is always free to miss the graduation ceremony, and so no coercion is involved by the state, Justice Kennedy responded as follows: "law reaches past formalism. And to say a teenage student has a real chance not to attend her high school graduation is formalistic in the extreme. . . . Everyone knows that in our society and in our culture high school graduation is one of life's most significant occasions." 47 The similarity in the analysis to Parents Involved and LULAC is unmistakable.
The constitutionality of the Second Reconstruction thus hinges on this seemingly simple question: how to explain Justice Kennedy's recent shift on race questions? In his early days on the Court, Justice Kennedy followed a narrow and formalistic colorblind path when interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. 48 He continued with this approach up to 2003, as seen in his dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger. 49 Even if we assume that the justice is now aware of these constitutional domains in ways he was not aware before, so that he no longer sees race the way he did, the obvious question is, why is he shifting now? Why are domains now relevant in race cases?
The answer lies somewhere in between. The fact that Kennedy is now a super-median matters a great deal. It is hardly a coincidence that his newfound voice on questions of race began the term after Justice O'Connor's retirement. But that is precisely why the question of domains has any bite at all. Once Justice Kennedy achieved super median status, he could let his aspirations and idealism run free, untethered by the preferences and idealism of others. In other words, Kennedy's opinions are not those of a pragmatist because they do not have to be. This is attitudinalism with a vengeance. Far more important than pinpointing the reasons for Kennedy's newfound jurisprudential awareness are the implications of this shift. This Essay discusses three such implications. First, Kennedy's shift has direct implications for constitutional litigation and the civil rights bar. Litigators must learn to speak in the language that now occupies Justice Kennedy's attention. Second, the shift has important implications for constitutional theory. The moral case against judicial review is powerful enough in the abstract. 50 The charge becomes almost unanswerable under a prism where a singular justice is able to single-handedly influence the future of the most pressing policy questions of our generation in accordance to his particular views and aspirations. This is a very serious charge against the institution of judicial review, a charge that demands an answer. Finally, and in line with the previous critique, Kennedy's shift has direct implications for constitutional law. This is because the end of the Second Reconstruction essentially hinges on the idealism of Justice Kennedy. This final section parses through Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence for clues on his thinking about this particular domain. 
A. What's in a Super-Median?
The concept of a swing -or median -justice is well-ingrained in our political consciousness. This is the one justice in the Court's ideological middle, the one vote that decides all the important and contested cases. Justice O'Connor was widely seen as a swing voter throughout his years on the Court, and so was Justice Powell. In recent years, and particularly since Justice O'Connor's retirement, Justice Kennedy is widely considered the Court's swing justice.
And yet, all medians are not the same; some are more powerful than others. Consider, for example, the fact that Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Souter could be considered at one time or another to have been the Court's median justices.
51 Differences in the power and influence of median justices are captured by the term "super median." According to Professors Epstein and Jacobi, super medians are those swing justices who "(1) are crucial to the formation of majority coalitions and, thus, to the outcome of any given decision and (2) are influential in dictating the terms of the Court's opinion and, thus, to the formulation of any precedent it establishes, especially in consequential or otherwise highprofile decisions." 52 Both of these conditions make sense. In order for a swing justice to merit the super 50 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999) . 51 See Epstein and Jacobi, supra note 14, at 54 (figure 3). 52 Id. at 51 median label, she must be a consistent member of the majority coalition, and she must also be influential within that coalition.
Epstein and Jacobi explain the rise of super medians as a function of the preferences of all other justices. In their words, attaining the status of super median is a "function of the relative proximity between the swing Justice and those nearest to him or her." 53 More specifically, super medians arise when two conditions are met. The first condition is what Epstein and Jacobi label the ideological "gap" between the median justice and the justices to her left and to her right on the Court's ideological continuum. As this gap grows, the less likely it is that majority opinions can be formed without the median voter. The second condition is what they call the "overlap" in the distribution of the preferences of the median justice and the closest justices decrease. 54 They illustrate this concept with the following figure: Making sense of this figure requires two preliminary explanations. First, note the small vertical line under each justice's name. This is the Martin Quinn ideal point estimate for that justice. This means, in other words, that this is the justice's most preferred position on the ideological continuum. 55 Second, the parabolas represent the distribution of the justice's preferences. 56 The narrower the parabola, the more consistent a justice's votes are, which in turn means that their ideal point provides a better approximation of their vote in any particular case. In contrast, a wider parabola means that the justice's vote is harder to predict consistently in reference to her ideal point. This shows flexibility on the justice's part, or the ability to join different coalitions.
The crucial insight here is how much the preference distribution of the median justice converges with those around her. The more that these preferences convergence, the more likely it is that majority coalitions can form without the median. This is exactly what happens to Justice Souter, the median 53 Id. at 43. 54 Id. at 74. 55 
B. Justice Kennedy as Super Median
It is a well established adage in American politics that swing justices hold the balance of power within the Court. This is particularly true for the super medians, that is, the justices whose positioning within the Court's ideological continuum invariably demands that they must form part of most majority coalitions. This is particularly important for close cases, when one vote makes all the difference in the outcome. This is when super medians can take the majority wherever they wish for it to go.
To suggest that Justice Kennedy is a super median is hardly a surprise. Far more interesting is the fact that he was so during the 2006 Term, when he authored Gonzalez v. Carhart 58 and provided the crucial fifth vote in Parents Involved. These two cases exemplify Justice Kennedy's status at the center of the Roberts Court. Carhart is important because it underscores how the big questions in constitutional law are directly influenced by Justice Kennedy. This is the quintessential role of a super median. Constitutional law is whatever the super median says it is. This is a remarkable power. As Noah Feldman recently explained, It is Kennedy's apparent unpredictability --and his willingness to make common cause with both factions in different cases --that is the source of his overwhelming power in court and country. This year, there have been nine 5-4 cases; Kennedy has been in the majority every time. (Last year he was the controlling vote in 12 of 17 cases decided 5-4; the previous year 20 out of 25.) 59 This description neatly encapsulates Kennedy's status on the Court as explained by Epstein and Jacobi. Justice Kennedy's "unpredictability" is reflected in a wider preference distribution, which in turn allows him to move among coalitions within the Court with relative ease. He is part of most narrow majority coalitions because the gap between his ideological preferences and those of the justices on either side of him is wide. These are the sources of Kennedy's power and influence.
But Parents Involved is just as important as an example of the freedom that a super median enjoys to expound on his particular constitutional vision. This is judicial independence in its truest form. Super medians can do as they wish because any winning coalition must include their votes in the final tally. This is where idiosyncratic legal theories take hold and unorthodox readings of legal texts receive an 61 Justice O'Connor left no doubt about the centrality of her views in this area, as she both wrote a majority opinion for the Court as well as a concurrence to her own majority. Upon Justice O'Connor's retirement, Justice Kennedy could finally assert his own views. This is when we see LULAC, decided the Term following O'Connor's retirement.
To say that Justice Kennedy's views changed once he became a super median, however, is not to solve the puzzle of Justice Kennedy's shift. For the question still remains: how to reconcile the early Kennedy with the Kennedy we see in LULAC and Parents Involved? One very attractive argument focuses on the concept of constitutional domains. According to Professor Gerken, the way to explain Justice Kennedy's shift is to look to the domains where these cases arise. In LULAC, the domain is not race itself but the First Amendment, political association, and political identity. In Parents Involved, similarly, the domain is also not race but public schools as socializing institutions, as sites where children learn to be good democratic citizens. Once he changes his filter, Justice Kennedy can then talk about race in far more interesting and helpful ways than when he focuses on race alone. Consider in this vein, for example, his apparent shift about the diversity rationale from Grutter to Parents Involved. In Grutter, Justice Kennedy is highly critical of the diversity rationale as a compelling state interest for higher education. Yet in Parents Involved, he embraces this same rationale. According to Professor Gerken, "Justice Kennedy's newfound embrace of Grutter suggests not a doctrinal switch, but a more fine-grained approach to the educational domain than either O'Connor or Scalia offered in that case." 62 The same can be said of his switch from the Shaw cases to LULAC.
To be sure, Professor Gerken makes a very compelling case that Justice Kennedy is up to something different from his prior jurisprudence. But her argument is still missing something important. This is because to agree that Justice Kennedy is now focusing on constitutional domains is not to answer the original puzzle, about the origin of this shift. Why is Justice Kennedy focused on constitutional domains in LULAC but not in Miller, in Parents Involved but not in Grutter? Similarly, how to explain his subsequent decisions in Ricci 63 and Bartlett, 64 where Justice Kennedy appears to revert back to his old, unimaginative and formalistic self? 60 Id. 61 517 U.S. 552 (1996) . 62 Gerken, supra note 37, at 117. 63 This is why I think that the answer must lie somewhere in between. Making sense of Justice Kennedy's shift demands that we look not only to his written opinions carefully and thoughtfully, as Professor Gerken has done, but also that we attend to the institutional question that lies at the heart of the shift. The fact that Justice Kennedy became a median justice beginning in 2006 is a crucial part of this story. This is because he can only entertain the idea of constitutional domains from a position of independence and strength, which is exactly what his status as super median affords him. Before then, Justice Kennedy had to behave far more strategically.
And while the early returns from the recently completed 2010 Court Term can be interpreted as somewhat equivocal, it remains true that Justice Kennedy remains safely in the Court's middle. Consider, first, the fact that he joined the majority of the Court in ninety-four percent of all decisions on the merits. 65 Chief Justice Roberts was the next justice with the highest frequency of votes with the majority, at ninety-one percent. 66 The same pattern holds when considering only divided cases, with Justice Kennedy forming part of the majority coalition eighty-eight percent of the time, and the Chief justice right behind him at eighty-three percent. Looking only at the five-to-four cases offers a similar picture. These are the cases worth looking at closely. They are the difficult cases where the Court often divides along ideological lines, and where the super medians put their influence to use. Out of 16 such cases, Justice Kennedy was in the majority 14 times, or eighty-eight percent. More tellingly, he joined the four conservative justices in ten 5-4 decisions, and the moderate justices in four of these cases. This is true of Justice Kennedy through the years, his ability to coalesce with both conservative and moderate coalitions. In order to see this, consider the following graph: Terms to joining fifty percent of the 5-4 decisions. This is a remarkable development. It also corroborates Epstein and Jacobi's insight that super medians may be as flexible and inconsistent as they wish to be. In fact, to be a super median means precisely that, the independence to join one's colleagues as needed. In Justice Kennedy's case, it demonstrates the ability to adapt in order to remain in control of the Court's decision-making. This is LULAC. This is also Parents Involved. A related explanation lies in the issue domains of the cases in question. 68 These are hardly the "politicomoral" issues that hold our collective attention but technical legal issues that matter only to the specific litigants and any affected publics. The meaning of the Federal Employment Liability Act, the requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the demands of the Confrontation Clause are not the issues that capture our attention. The same can be said of the justices. These are the kinds of issues that the justices could decide in near anonymity and with true independence.
In saying all of this, I do not intend to minimize in any way Justice Kennedy's role within the Court. He remains, in Lyle Denniston's words, "the virtual embodiment of the tendencies of the Roberts Court." 69 As we look to the future, we must continue to pay attention to whatever Justice Kennedy says and does. This is, after all, "Justice Anthony Kennedy's country -the rest of us just live in it." 70 The next Part examines the implications of this argument for the future of the Second Reconstruction.
II. Shifting Sands: The Evolving Race Jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy
Something is amiss in Justice Kennedy's race jurisprudence. Go back to his early days on the Court, the days v. Cayetano, 74 and you cannot miss the uncompromising and narrow nature of his approach to the use of race by the state. This is true both as a question of constitutional law and when interpreting federal law. But the story has begun to shift in recent years. In both LULAC and Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy is far more nuanced and compromising in his approach to the use of race. These decisions cannot be reconciled with Kennedy's early decisions. The justice is clearly undergoing a shift in his thinking as reflected in his written opinions. This first Part details this shift.
A. First Pass: City of Richmond, Metro Broadcasting and Race Neutrality
In his early years on the Court, Justice Kennedy displayed a clear suspicion of any use of race by the state, as reflected in his uncompromising application of strict scrutiny across settings and contexts. This was true whether the governmental entity in question was a state, a local government, or any branch of the national government. This was also true even if the racial classification was benign in nature, designed to benefit historically underrepresented minorities. To Justice Kennedy, all uses of race must be catalogued under the same rubric, irrespective of the motive behind its implementation. Jim Crow laws, South African apartheid laws, and affirmative action policies were one and the same. Context and history meant nothing.
His first pass at the question came in City of Richmond v. Croson. 75 In the case, the Court must decide whether a 30% racial set-aside policy by the Richmond city council could withstand constitutional scrutiny. This was not by any reasonable measure an easy case. The first obvious difficulty centered on the proper standard of review for laws intended to benefit members of underrepresented racial groups. The case also forced the Court to confront the legacy of discrimination in the South and the steps that state and local governments may take in compliance with the Equal Protection Clause to remedy this legacy. A final difficulty focused on the set-aside policy at the heart of the case. This was a classic and expected outcome of a political struggle as seen every day in American politics. Could the Court strike down this particular bargain under the guise of upholding a prior constitutional compromise intended to bring former slaves into full citizenship status?
The conservative majority on the Court had very little difficulty striking down the Richmond set-aside policy. In a lead opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, the Court concluded that the use of race by the state must be subject to strict scrutiny. This was true irrespective of the stated intentions of those who enacted the policies and regardless of the source of the policy. In fact, in this particular case, the majority found reason to be distrustful of the political body behind the policy, since the Richmond city council had a majority-black membership. Accordingly, "[t]he concern that a political majority will more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to militate for, not against, the application of heightened judicial scrutiny in this case."
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The Court was also unpersuaded by the context in the case, and the fact that this was an attempt by the city of Richmond to address its own legacy of discrimination. This point elicited a spirited response from 74 528 U.S. 495 (2000) . 75 Justice Kennedy concurred in the case, for two reasons. First, with Justice Scalia, he agreed that the principle of race neutrality lies as the moral imperative behind the command of equal protection. And yet, he did not sign on to Justice Scalia's opinion, which adopted a bright line rule of striking down all racial preferences that are not designed to remedy prior unlawful acts of racial discrimination. Instead, he wrote separately to underscore his agreement with Justice O'Connor's adoption of a strict scrutiny test. He did so because he was "not convinced" that Scalia's rigid test was necessary "at this point." He was also "confident" that the strict scrutiny test would "in application . . . operate in a manner generally consistent with the imperative of race neutrality." Put simply, there was no nuance there. There was no discussion of context, or history, or of the source for the command of racial neutrality. This was a simplistic, straight-forward concurrence. Race is dangerous and toxic, and it is up to the Court to ensure that states use it only in the rarest of moments.
Second, Justice Kennedy was not ready to decide whether the source of the challenged policy mattered for constitutional purposes. Or, in his words, "[t]he process by which a law that is an equal protection violation when enacted by a State becomes transformed to an equal protection guarantee when enacted by Congress poses a difficult proposition for me; but as it is not before us, any reconsideration of that issue must await some further case."
78 This is an important concession. It underscores Justice Kennedy's penchant for deliberate adjudication as demanded by the common law approach. 79 But he need not wait too long to decide the question. 81 Consequently, the Court held that race-conscious plans directed by the federal government must serve important governmental goals and must be substantially related to those goals. The plan in question, the Court concluded, met this standard of review. 77 Id. at 558. 78 Id. at 518. 79 See also id. at 519 ("Nevertheless, given that a rule of automatic invalidity for racial preferences in almost every case would be a significant break with our precedents that require a case-by-case test, I am not convinced we need adopt it at this point."). 80 Justice Kennedy concludes his short dissent with a passage worth quoting in full:
Perhaps the Court can succeed in its assumed role of case-by-case arbiter of when it is desirable and benign for the Government to disfavor some citizens and favor others based on the color of their skin. Perhaps the tolerance and decency to which our people aspire will let the disfavored rise above hostility and the favored escape condescension. But history suggests much peril in this enterprise, and so the Constitution forbids us to undertake it. I regret that after a century of judicial opinions we interpret the Constitution to do no more than move us from "separate but equal" to "unequal but benign."
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This passage highlights Justice Kennedy's narrow and acontextual approach to the use of race by the state. Its lessons are clear. Race is no more than skin color. Our racial history counsels that the use of race poses grave dangers. And there is no such thing as benign uses of race. We use race as a public policy tool at our own peril.
B. Coming into his own: Miller's Tale
82 Id. at 632. 83 Id. at 633 n.1 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 84 See id. at 633, 635. In response, the majority "fail[s] to understand how Justice Kennedy can pretend that examples of "benign" race-conscious measures include South African apartheid, the "separate-but-equal" law at issue in Plessy v. Ferguson, and the internment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry upheld in Korematsu v. United States." Id. at 564 n.12. And more importantly, the majority is just as confident as Justice Kennedy is not that an 'examination of the legislative scheme and its history' will separate benign measures from other types of racial classifications." Id. 85 Id. at 637-38.
The 1990 Census and the resulting redistricting season thrust the Court right in the middle of a very contentious debate over the role of race in politics. This debate presented the justices with very difficult questions of representation. How best to represent the interests of voters of color as required by the Voting Rights Act? In other words, how to resolve the inevitable tension between descriptive representation, which entailed the creation of majority minority districts, and substantive representation, which focused on the election of like-minded representatives irrespective of race? Complicating matters, the use of race in redistricting has clear and direct political consequences. This is because racial minorities -and particularly black voters -are generally Democratic voters. To create majority-minority districts is to essentially pack Democratic voters. It is no surprise that Republican strategists prefer these districts, while Democratic leaders favor the representation of interests.
In the early 1990's, this tension reached the high court. And the justices failed to impress. The first case, Shaw v. Reno, 86 arose out of familiar circumstances. Democratic leaders in North Carolina drew a state congressional map with only one majority-minority district. The Department of Justice objected to this first plan and demanded the creation of a second majority minority district. This objection arose from the authority granted to the DOJ by the Voting Rights Act. Whether this was the proper reading of the Act or not, it was clear that the state of North Carolina only drew this second district when required to do so by federal authorities. But there were only so many Democratic voters to spread around, so in order to uphold the gains of the previous plan while complying with DOJ's reading of the law demanded much cartographical creativity. In the eyes of the conservative majority on the Court, in fact, the resulting districts were simply bizarre, too ugly for words, and clearly unconstitutional. In Justice O'Connor's words, we believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes.
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A few things jump right off from this passage. First, note the allusion to apartheid once again. The analogy is particularly inapt here, since the districts at issue were some of the most integrated districts in the country and a near-perfect reflection of the racial composition of the state as a whole. 88 Second, the anti-essentialist impulse could not be clearer. People must be treated by the state as individuals and not members of groups, and they must not be stereotyped into roles and ascribed identities that they have not chosen for themselves.
86 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 87 Id. at 647. 88 See Pamela S. Karlan Third, it is important that the Court paid no attention to the context under which this case arose and the empirical realities on the ground. The fact that the state had been forced to draw the second district, or the fact that the pressure had come under DOJ's particular reading of the VRA, proved irrelevant. The Court majority had its own particular story, and it was sticking to it.
Finally, it is crucial that the facts in Shaw did not fit traditional conceptions of constitutional harm in the voting rights context as then understood. That is, the facts fit neither vote dilution nor vote denial claims. This was something completely different; unless it was not different at all. The Court held that the use of race in redistricting violates equal protection principles when "a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification." 89 In so holding, the Court conceded that this claim was "analytically distinct" 90 from traditional equal protection claims. The claim soon came to be known as an "expressive harm." 91 The reach of this inquiry, at least in 1993, appeared boundless. 92 the Court confronted a districting scheme that resembled the traditional districts of old. The context was eerily similar: a districting plan, a DOJ objection, and the creation of a new majority black district. What this plan lacked was a bizarre district in the mold of Shaw. In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, however, the Court explained that "bizarreness is [not] a necessary element of the constitutional wrong or a threshold requirement of proof." 93 Rather, shape is important "because it may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines." 94 This was the genesis, two years after Shaw, of the predominant factor test.
In concluding, Justice Kennedy offered an ode to the anti-essentialist principle at the heart of his opinion.
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The [Voting Rights] Act, and its grant of authority to the federal courts to uncover official efforts to abridge minorities' right to vote, has been of vital importance in eradicating invidious discrimination from the electoral process and enhancing the legitimacy of our political institutions. Only if our political system and our society cleanse themselves of that discrimination will all members of the polity share an equal opportunity to gain public office regardless of race. As a Nation we share both the obligation and the aspiration of working toward this end. The end is neither assured nor well served, however, by carving electorates into racial blocs. . . . It takes a shortsighted and unauthorized view of the Voting Rights Act to invoke that statute, which has played a decisive role in redressing some of our worst forms of discrimination, to demand the very racial stereotyping the Fourteenth Amendment forbids.
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This conclusion is in line with Shaw in that they both share a disdain with race essentialism. Both opinions make clear that the state must not choose political identities for the voters; this is something that each individual voter must do for herself. Both opinions are also borne of an idealism that wishes to remove race from public life. This is true even if the facts on the ground counsel otherwise, and irrespective of the views held by other institutional actors. The conservative majority holds epistemic authority on this question under its interpretation of the equality principle. There is simply no room for debate.
In the next case in this long and forgettable saga, Justice Kennedy reinforced his formalism on questions of race and redistricting. The case was Bush v. Vera. 97 Two particular passages of his concurring opinion intrigue me. The first is the passage where he argues that the Court "would no doubt apply strict scrutiny if a State decreed that certain districts had to be at least 50 percent white, and our analysis should be no different if the State so favors minority races."
98 This is an arresting sentence. To be sure, a demand that districts must be "at least 50 percent white" should strike us as odd and even bizarre. The world of race and politics as practiced in the United States would have to evolve dramatically for such a demand to make any sense at all. I cannot even begin to imagine what such a would would look like. This is another way of saying that context and history make all the difference in the world. That Justice Kennedy uses this passage as a way to clinch his argument that strict scrutiny is the obvious standard in the case tells us a great deal about his frame of mind on questions of race in the mid-1990's.
The second is a passage where Justice Kennedy offers as an example of an unjustified racial district the notion of "gratuitous race-based districting." 99 This would be districting where the state used race for no particular reason at all. To Justice Kennedy, any use of race by the state unsupported by a compelling state interest is a "gratuitous" use of race. This is something that the state must not do. Without question, this is a very narrow and unforgiving understanding of race. It is also dismissive of our racial history. But more importantly, it is also the law. 
C. A New Leaf: LULAC and Parents Involved

equality."
101 This is a view of race as a "corrosive category," and one where only a narrowly tailored policy that pursues a compelling state interest can meet his standard of fairness. 102 Above all, as he reiterated throughout his dissent, his concern was that all applicants must receive individualized review. This is the same anti-essentialist sentiment he expressed through the years. 
LULAC and Latino Essentialism under the Voting Rights Act
When it comes to Justice Kennedy's views about the Voting Rights Act, we know two things: first, that he is deeply committed to an anti-essentialist reading of anti-discrimination law, and the VRA lies at the core of this commitment; and second, that he is ambivalent about the constitutionality of the Act. Taken together, these two commitments make Justice Kennedy a reliable vote on the Court for strict, narrow, and often acontextual readings of the Act. 106 This is also what makes LULAC v. Perry 107 such a puzzling opinion. This case is worthy of attention because it appears to compromise both commitments.
In LULAC, the Court faced the mid-decade Texas gerrymander orchestrated by Congressman Tom DeLay. In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court struck down one of the challenged districts under section 2 of the Act. Incidentally, this was the first time in the history of the Act that the Court had so held under section 2. In order to reach this conclusion, Justice Kennedy must face his anti-essentialist reading of anti-discrimination law. He must also confront his long-standing skepticism about the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. On both of these questions, his published opinion is nothing short of astounding.
Consider first the anti-essentialist critique. This is the concept that individuals must be treated as individuals and not as members of groups. Justice Kennedy is firmly within this camp, as we saw earlier.
And yet, in LULAC, Justice Kennedy was taken by the fact that the Texas plan had removed Latinos from a particular district because they were about to achieve a numerical majority and act against the incumbent Republican congressman, Henry Bonilla. This was something that the state could not do. More importantly, Justice Kennedy's concern was that "the State took away the Latinos' opportunity because Latinos were about to exercise it." That is to say, Latinos, not Democratic voters, were about to achieve real political power, and only then would the state step in and ensure their minority status. In Justice Kennedy's words,
[e]ven if we accept the District Court's finding that the State's action was taken primarily for political, not racial, reasons, the redrawing of the district lines was damaging to the Latinos in District 23. The State not only made fruitless the Latinos' mobilization efforts but also acted against those Latinos who were becoming most politically active, dividing them with a district line through the middle of Laredo.
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This is a remarkable statement coming from a justice who explicitly derides the essentialization of voters of color in the name of a particular brand of racial justice. This is the same justice, after all, who wrote a decade earlier: "When the State assigns voters on the basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race, "'think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.'" 109 In the Shaw cases, treating Democratic voters as black voters was to engage in demeaning stereotyping. In LULAC, to treat Latinos as Democratic voters was a cognizable harm under section 2. Reconciling the tension between the old Justice Kennedy and the new is difficult if not downright impossible.
One way out of this tension is apparent, yet ultimately flawed. In the Shaw cases, the plaintiffs argued successfully that the resulting shape of the majority minority districts in question was bizarre to the point of unconstitutionality. As a statutory question, it could be argued that minority voters in North Carolina's District 12 did not have a section 2 right to their district. This is because they could not meet all three of Gingles' factors.
110 Quite obviously, they could not meet the first factor, the compactness requirement. The bizarre nature of the challenged districts made clear that black voters in District 12 were not "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district." 111 In LULAC, however, Justice Kennedy concluded that Latino voters in the old District 23 held a section 2 right to their district. One could argue that this conclusion alone renders a comparison between the two cases inapposite.
To so exonerate Justice Kennedy would be to miss the most interesting and important part of his opinion in LULAC. To be sure, Justice Kennedy concluded that Latinos in District 23 held a section 2 right to their district, a right that the legislature could not take away from them. But far more telling is how hard he must labor to reach this conclusion. 112 The Chief Justice, for one, was not impressed:
Whatever the majority believes it is fighting with its holding, it is not vote dilution on the basis of race or ethnicity. I do not believe it is our role to make judgments about which mixes of minority voters should count for purposes of forming a majority in an electoral district, in the face of factual findings that the district is an effective majority-minority district.
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It is downright impossible to read the Chief Justice's dissent and not puzzle over what Justice Kennedy might be up to. It may very well be that he is intent on having a say on the clumsy and distasteful way in which Republicans, both in Texas and at the national level, conducted themselves. 114 But it is also true that whatever his motivations, Justice Kennedy clearly aligned himself with a view about race in the political context that he abhorred a decade before. LULAC simply does not square with Shaw and its progeny.
The second point is equally baffling. Up to his controlling opinion in LULAC, it is hardly a stretch to consider Justice Kennedy a foe of the Voting Rights Act in general and racial districts in particular. 
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These are not the words of a staunch supporter of section 2 of the Act but, rather, the words of one who is waiting for the right moment to strike it down on constitutional grounds. There can be no other way if the predominant factor test retains any vitality. This is because any time section 2 of the Act is invoked, race will predominate. This was Shaw, and this was also Miller.
In LULAC, however, race predominated, and unapologetically so. Yet Justice Kennedy was hardly the skeptic justice he had been in the recent past. Instead, no hurdle proved too difficult for him: not the lower court's findings and the clear error test; 117 not the actual words of the lower court's opinion; 118 and certainly not the constitutional concerns that occupied him in the past. The right of Latinos in District 23 to their district must be vindicated, and Justice Kennedy joined the moderates and happily put himself up to the task. In an important sense, the opinion is vintage Kennedy: school districts can use race in student assignments, but can only do so as a last resort. This is the controlling opinion in case, and so it demands carefully scrutiny. But Kennedy's concurring opinion is far more important because it continues with the story of Kennedy's transformation begun in LULAC. This is not the Kennedy of old, the author of narrow and inflexible opinions. This is a justice willing to give complex constitutional questions their due care. Three arguments deserve close attention.
Parents Involved and the Legacy of Brown
The first argument highlights the debate within the Court over the legacy of Brown. Chief Justice Roberts quoted from the plaintiffs' briefs in Brown that "the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from according differential treatment to American children on the basis of their color or race." 120 He then asked, "[w]hat do the racial classifications at issue here do, if not accord differential treatment on the basis of race?"
121 Justice Thomas similarly argued that "[r]acial imbalance is not segregation," 122 and so the school districts in Louisville and Seattle are not pursuing the constitutional goals of Brown. With the Chief Justice, Justice Thomas wrote that the opposite is in fact true: the reformers in Louisville and Seattle are in the same moral and constitutional space as the segregationists who defended segregated school systems in Brown.
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The dissenters took a decidedly different view of history. Justice Stevens chided the Chief Justice for relying on Brown to strike down racial balancing plans. More specifically, he argued that the Chief Justice "rewrites the history of one of the Court's most important decisions."
124 Justice Breyer similarly wrote that "it is a cruel distortion of history to compare Topeka, Kansas, in the 1950's to Louisville and Seattle in the modern day -to equate the plight of Linda Brown (who was ordered to attend a Jim Crow school) to the circumstances of Joshua McDonald (whose request to transfer to a school closer to home was initially declined)." This is by way of preface to my respectful submission that parts of the opinion by The Chief Justice imply an all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my view, it may be taken into account. The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race. The plurality's postulate that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race," ante, at 40-41, is not sufficient to decide these cases. Fifty years of experience since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) , should teach us that the problem before us defies so easy a solution. School districts can seek to reach Brown's objective of equal educational opportunity. The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. I cannot endorse that conclusion. To the extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.
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Justice Kennedy's position is surprising because he is willing to recognize that the questions facing the Louisville and Seattle school boards are difficult questions, devoid of simplistic answers. This is a remarkable shift for a justice who once agreed with the view that the creation of bizarre majorityminority districts bore an uncomfortable resemblance to racial apartheid.
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The second argument looks back to the Grutter case and the diversity rationale. To be sure, the mere use of a prior case as settled law should hardly qualify as noteworthy. But Kennedy is not simply accepting Grutter as settled law; in fact, he is reversing himself within the space of four years. 128 Whereas in Grutter he chastised Justice O'Connor's use of the diversity rationale, in Parents Involved he suggested that "a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population. Race may be one component of that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered." 129 Explaining this change is not easy.
The third argument focuses on what might well be the most influential conservative canard in history: Justice Harlan's colorblind language in Plessy v. Ferguson. 130 The passage reads as follows: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." 131 Conservative jurists and commentators often turn to this language while criticizing affirmative action and similar policies as inconsistent with constitutional principles. This is an argument for the moral equivalence of racial segregation and racial integration. 132 All uses of race, no matter their motives, are suspect and presumed unconstitutional. As Chief Justice wrote at the close of his opinion in Parents involved, "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race."
Criticisms of this line of argument are plentiful, from diverse quarters. 134 The one place one would not expect a critique to arise is Kennedy's chambers. In Parents Involved, however, this is exactly what Justice Kennedy did. In his words,
The statement by Justice Harlan that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind" was most certainly justified in the context of his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896). The Court's decision in that case was a grievous error it took far too long to overrule. Plessy, of course, concerned official classification by race applicable to all persons who sought to use railway carriages. And, as an aspiration, Justice Harlan's axiom must command our assent. In the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle. 
III. Why it Matters
To this point, I have argued that as a super-median, Justice Kennedy is free and independent to decide cases as idiosyncratically as he wishes to decide them. This is why we witness a shift in his views on race, from an uncompromising stance in his early years on the Court and through 2003, to a more flexible and contextual approach beginning around 2006. The implications of this shift are far-reaching. The implications for constitutional litigation are obvious: for the politico-moral cases, 136 those cases that grab the public's attention and energize the culture wars, the vote of Justice Kennedy is crucial. Such is the life of a super median. In turn, the implications for constitutional theory directly follow; this is the countermajoritarian difficulty on steroids. Is it possible to defend the notion that a single justice, if properly situated within the Court's ideological spectrum, can determine some of the most important constitutional questions of his generation? The final section examines the implications of this question for constitutional law generally, and in so doing makes this abstract question far more concrete. This is the question of the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, the "crown jewel" of the civil rights movement. Is the constitutionality of the Act really in the hands of Justice Kennedy? Assuming that Justice Kennedy retains his status as super median, so that he remains independent to consult his newfound domains jurisprudence, how is he likely to answer this question? Justice Kennedy's status as super median has obvious implications for constitutional litigation. As the one justice whose vote must form part of any majority coalition, litigators must pay undue attention to Justice Kennedy's preferences. This makes for challenging strategizing. Justice Kennedy's wide preference distribution -his known "unpredictability" -makes the task of predicting his vote difficult. But there are clues.
A. Constitutional Litigation
The first basic step is to focus on the particular domain in question. Context matters. Whether public schools, questions of political association and identity, or prison reform, Justice Kennedy is moved and influenced by the particular domain where the questions arise. This is important. The next step is more challenging. Once a particular domain is identified, litigators must try to assess the proper principles that govern the particular domain. Professor Gerken does a terrific job of identifying the principles that govern the public school and political association domains in Justice Kennedy's constitutional world. But she does so by cobbling together bits and pieces from Justice Kennedy's written opinions. I wonder whether she would have been able to identify similar principles without the benefit of Kennedy's written account. Looking to the future, the task is to identify what those principles may be. Two principles stand out above all others. 137 The first principle -and here Justice Kennedy is channeling his inner-Brennan 143 The lesson is clear: "Anyone who wants to win his vote would do well to argue that someone's dignity is being violated somewhere." 144 The second principle is the jealous protection of the authority of the judiciary to interpret the Constitution. Justice Kennedy is clearly a judicial supremacist, and this is true across myriad settings and contexts. The classic exposition of this principle appears in City of Boerne v. Flores, 145 a case where Kennedy appeared miffed that Congress had attempted to overrule a judicial interpretation of a Whatever one thinks about the straight-forward simplicity of the argument, it remains true that Bickel's charge dominated constitutional scholarship almost from the time that Bickel issued his challenge. 152 Some argue that it still does. 153 The response, in fact, is said to border on an "obsession." 154 As a general matter, the claim is not terribly interesting, nor is it descriptively accurate. For all the noise that surrounds Bickel's famed difficulty, it is still true that the Court is seldom out of step with public opinion for long. 155 The appointment process ensures as much. 156 To be sure, the Court is not a majoritarian institution in every case, but this is hardly an indictment on the institution. The fact that the Court can stand against public opinion is an interesting question in its own right, but that is not the question that Bickel asked. 157 For my purposes, the example of Justice Kennedy as super median indicts the institution of judicial review in a far more important and revealing way. It is challenging to justify as a normative matterthough not impossible -granting the Supreme Court the power to overrule the present wishes of elected officials on the basis of vague and imprecise constitutional language. Bickel got this much right.
But could anyone defend granting one justice the power to decide some of the most difficult and contested questions of public policy in a country of well over 300 million people? Put differently, how to defend Justice Kennedy's role on the Court as super median? This is an arresting claim. Consider in this vein Justice Kennedy's recent shift on questions of race. This essay argues that the best way to explain it is by looking to Kennedy's newfound status as super median, which in turn allowed him to contextualize his jurisprudence accordingly, in domain-like fashion. That is to say, Justice Kennedy is now able to explore his views about public schools, the crafting of district lines as politically associative practices protected by the First Amendment, or the role that the concept of human dignity must play in decision-making. The Constitution is whatever Justice Kennedy says it is, irrespective of text, history, precedent, or even Justice Kennedy's own views on the matter. It is a brave new world, but that is precisely the world of the super median. This is a remarkable power. It is also unjustifiable. This is why Justice Kennedy's position on the Court, and his recent shift, offer an inimitable example of attitudinalist jurisprudence and its perils. To see more clearly the implications of this view, the next section turns to a more concrete example. This is the ongoing debate over the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act.
C. Constitutional Law and the Challenge to the Second Reconstruction
To this day, the Voting Rights Act stands as the clearest example of our national commitment to eradicating racial discrimination from the political process. The problem at hand had proven quite difficult, even intractable. Dating back to the late nineteenth century, jurisdictions throughout the South institutionalized the mass disenfranchisement of otherwise eligible Black voters. 158 This condition endured unabated for well over half a century. When Congress finally faced up to the problem, it could only do so from a position of weakness so long as southern congressmen held together. The resulting legislation -the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 -reflected this weakness. The best the legislation could do was open up the federal courts to adjudicate claims of racial discrimination in voting. But such a response proved no match for the ingenuity and recalcitrance of defiant southern jurisdictions. A stronger response was needed.
This was the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The success of the Act can be attributed to the fact that it radically shifted basic legal burdens and presumptions. Under prior law, the federal government must come to local courts and carry its burden of showing the unconstitutionality of the laws under review. In other words, the laws were presumed constitutional unless and until the federal government could prove otherwise in open court. Under the VRA, however, any voting law enacted by jurisdictions covered by section 4 of the Act is presumed to be unconstitutional until the federal government determines otherwise. These covered jurisdictions were also subject to the appointment of poll watchers and voting registrars. No longer would the voting rights of voters of color be subject to the whims of local registrars and state and local governments.
Almost as soon as President Johnson signed the bill into law, South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of the new law. Unremarkably, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 159 the Supreme Court sided with the overwhelming national coalition that supported the law. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren, the Court concluded that the Act was a rational response to a problem that had plagued the country for generations. The Court was deferring to congressional wishes, to be sure, but this was no run-of-the-mill rationality review. Having myriad testimony and congressional findings at its disposal, the Court made use of them all, as if to justify the aggressive nature of the new law. This approach to constitutional review did not sit well with Justice Brennan. 160 In notes he wrote to the Chief Justice on the margins of the first circulated draft of the opinion, Brennan questioned the need to include any reference to legislative findings in the opinion. Justice Brennan was looking to the future. To be sure, the record in support of the VRA was robust and exemplary. He knew that the Court would not always have access to such a record.
History has borne out Brennan's critique. In the very next case -Katzenbach v. Morgan 161 --the Court faced a similarly difficult constitutional question: assuming the constitutionality of the literacy test, 162 could Congress prohibit the denial of the right to vote to a person who completed a sixth grade education in Puerto Rico (presumably an education in Spanish) due to her inability to read or write English? The answer could not be clearer: Congress could presumably not do so unless it could show, as in South Carolina, that the state law was racially discriminatory. But there was only one problem, which Justice Harlan was happy to point out in dissent: Congress had proffered no findings in support of this provision. 163 Not a one. This was nothing more than a "legislative announcement" 164 that the law in question violated equal protection principles. In writing the opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan must thus rely on traditional rational basis review, the kind that places few if any demands on legislatures. And that is precisely what he did. In the face of a barren record, he wrote, for example, that "s 4(e) may be viewed as a measure to secure for the Puerto Rican community residing in New York nondiscriminatory treatment by government-both in the imposition of voting qualifications and the provision or administration of governmental services, such as public schools, public housing and law enforcement." 165 The Court was not about to engage in a review of a non-existent record, so it was left to argue that "[i]t is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did." 166 This was rationality "review" by name only.
Through the years, Justice Brennan's concerns took on added significance. While upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the Court would often highlight facts on the record to support its decision. In City of Rome v. United States, 167 for example, the Court offered the following:
In considering the 1975 extension, Congress acknowledged that largely as a result of the Act, Negro voter registration had improved dramatically since 1965. Congress determined, however, that "a bleaker side of the picture yet exists." Significant disparity persisted between the percentages of whites and Negroes registered in at least several of the covered jurisdictions. In addition, though the number of Negro elected officials had increased since 1965, most held only relatively minor positions, none held statewide office, and their number in the state legislatures fell far short of being representative of the number of Negroes residing in the covered jurisdictions. Congress concluded that, because minority political progress under the Act, though "undeniable," had been "modest and spotty," extension of the Act was warranted.
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This is now an accepted axiom in our constitutional law, that Congress' enforcement powers must be exercised only when supported by an adequate record. This is the central teaching of City of Boerne v. Flores. 169 But to suggest that this requirement began with City of Boerne is to be blind to the lessons of history. Justice Brennan could foresee this outcome a generation before. This is where we find ourselves today. In Namudno v. Holder, 170 the demise of the VRA seemed inevitable, by a 5-4 vote and with Justice Kennedy casting the deciding vote. The oral argument led to no other conclusion. Once the opinion came out months later, however, the justices went out of their way to avoid the constitutional question, choosing instead to decide the case on statutory grounds, even if such grounds made no sense at all. The most sensible way to interpret the Namudno decision is by placing four justices on either side of the constitutional divide, with an undecided Justice Kennedy in the middle. Unable to reach an agreement on the constitutional question, the Court did the only sensible thing, which was to avoid the question altogether. The door remains open until Justice Kennedy makes up his mind one way or another. This would not be the first time that Justice Kennedy holds constitutional doctrine hostage to his idealism.
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The question for the future of the Voting Rights Act thus hinges on Justice Kennedy's approach to this particular question. Two approaches appear likely. Justice Kennedy may look back to his federalism jurisprudence and the concept of human dignity as applied to the states. This is an argument that ascribes to the states a dignitary interest. In Kennedy's words, "[t]he States thus retain 'a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.' They are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations, 167 446 U.S. 156 (1980) . 168 Id. at 180-81. 169 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 170 but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty." 172 This is also an argument that resonates in conservative circles and dates back to the Senate debates in the Summer of 1965, when critics of the Act equated the status of covered jurisdictions to that of "conquered provinces." 173 More recently, critics similarly allude to the myriad "federalism costs" imposed by the Act. 174 If Justice Kennedy understands the effect of the Act under this rubric, it is likely that he will side with the conservatives and strike down the special provisions of the Act. But by no means is this argument a slam dunk. 175 Alternatively, Justice Kennedy might return to his concurring opinion in Parents Involved, where he acknowledged that Justice Harlan's paean to the colorblind principle in his Plessy dissent remains an elusive ideal. "In the real world," Justice Kennedy wrote, "it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle." 176 The same is true in the voting rights context. The history of race and voting rights in the United States is, most notably, a history of outright defiance at the state and local level to the enfranchisement of colored citizens.
177 This is the history that Congress confronted in 1965, and which the Court cited in support of the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. While much has improved in the intervening four decades, Congress determined in 2006 that the Act remains a necessary tool in the fight against racial discrimination in voting. Whether rightly or wrongly, it stands to reason that the same "real world" that led Justice Kennedy to soften his views in Parents Involved should lead him to soften them here as well. After all, as in Parents Involved, "the problem before us defies so easy a solution."
178 This is another way of saying that if the recent past is any indication, both context and history should lead Justice Kennedy to uphold the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act.
Conclusion
The fate of the Second Reconstruction rests in the hands of Justice Kennedy. At first glance, this is a concern for anybody who cares about racial justice. But Justice Kennedy's recent jurisprudential turn on questions of race, which this Essay explains by pointing to his status on the Court as a super median, is encouraging. This is an encouraging turn not because Justice Kennedy will ultimately reach the right answers to these questions, whatever those answers may be, but because he is turning away from the
